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Is the hard problem of consciousness really all that hard?: A Neurophenomenological Review

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Pages: 2009-2013
Taronish Pastakia (Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Gandhinagar, Gujarat)

As the title suggests, my research questions border on skepticism towards the notion of the so called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness first introduced by Chalmers. Based on this very assumption that the hard problem actually exists, Francisco Varela has whipped up a whole new branch of science called Neurophenomenology. Varela has tried to marry the fields of phenomenology and cognitive science, again on the very basic assumption that consciousness exists as an independent cognitive modality and by extension a methodology for its so called rigorous description (called phenomenology) is needed. The reason why these basic assumptions are constantly questioned by the scientific community is that consciousness, even as a mere entity (let alone a cognitive modality), is pathetically ill-defined. To put it bluntly, all the big names in the field of consciousness studies have described consciousness in very ambiguous terms and oftentimes using contradictory arguments leading to a half-baked job when it comes to actually defining it. For example, Chalmers repeatedly makes the statement that the description of consciousness entails “what it is like” to experience something with hardly any satisfactory explanation or extrapolation on it. “What it is like” isn’t really all that convincing a definition, especially when the validity of entire branches of science hangs on this very definition. In sum, Phenomenologists have a certain set of jargon and psychologists/neuroscientists/cognitive scientists have another set. Varela tries to draw links between the two demarcated sets and thus coins his term ‘Neurophenomenology’. My contention is that the two sets of jargon are just corresponding synonyms and therefore there is simply no need to draw links between the two. Can we can do away with the terminology or concept of consciousness itself and explain it with jargon borrowed from cognitive science to make life easier for everyone? Or is such a proposition far too over-simplistic and naïve?

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Pages: 2009-2013
Taronish Pastakia (Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Gandhinagar, Gujarat)